



An Immodest Proposal: How the Kansas Supreme 
Court Can Unify the Uniform Trade Secret Act’s 
Preemption of Common Law Claims 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a small business in Wichita, Kansas, that manufactures 
conveyor pizza ovens finally begins a dramatic expansion in anticipation 
of signing a contract to supply all of the ovens for Domino’s Pizza.  
About a year earlier, the small business had hired a human resources 
consultant to help with this expansion.  This new employee has been 
successful in his human resources role, so the business discusses with 
him the possibility of serving as president of the company.  He agrees, 
and the business has its attorney draft an employment agreement, which 
the employee signs.  The employment contract includes a restrictive 
covenant that prohibits the employee from revealing the business’s trade 
secrets and other confidential business information. 
Unfortunately, the small business’s relationship with its new 
president starts to sour.  The president decides to resign after receiving a 
number of formal reprimands and a two-day, unpaid suspension.  He 
cleans out his desk and file cabinet upon his departure.  After separating 
from the business, the now-former employee decides to start his own 
company.  He calls his uncle who has a Ph.D. in food science and had 
previously worked in research and development.  He also calls the owner 
of a metal fabrication company.  Together, they form a company that 
manufactures commercial pizza ovens.  As their first order of business, 
they decide to reverse engineer a pizza oven his former employer—the 
small business—manufactures.  The business has no patent protection.  
Within three months, the new company has successfully assembled its 
first oven. 
After hearing that its former employee had assembled a pizza oven in 
such a short period of time, the small business begins to suspect that the 
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former employee took trade secrets and other confidential information to 
aid in replicating the oven.  After receiving calls from several vendors 
indicating that the former employee has ordered from them the same 
parts that the small business uses in manufacturing its pizza ovens, the 
small business’s suspicions are essentially confirmed.  It decides to file 
suit against the former employee, claiming that he breached his 
employment contract, misappropriated the business’s trade secrets, and 
breached his fiduciary duty.  The business also files suit against the 
former employee’s new company, asserting claims of misappropriation 
of trade secrets and tortious interference of a contractual relationship.  It 
alleges that the former employee and his company misappropriated eight 
pieces of information: (1) a vendor list, (2) a customer list, (3) design 
drawings, (4) the oven’s particular handle, (5) the electrical components, 
(6) the lifting plates, (7) the oven’s layout, and (8) a bill of materials. 
Several months after the small business files suit against the former 
employee, the former employee’s new company secures a contract with 
Wings-N-Things.  The small business had viewed Wings-N-Things as a 
potential customer because it had previously purchased one of its ovens 
through a distributor. 
This factual scenario describes the underlying facts in the recently 
decided Kansas case Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth.1  Because the 
design of its pizza oven and other confidential business information were 
unpatented, Wolfe Electric had to rely on the Kansas Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (KUTSA) for protection.2  Essentially, a “trade secret” is 
some piece of information that the owner wants to keep secret by 
whatever means available so that nonconsensual release of the 
information occurs only by a tort or a breach of contract.3  This 
unpatented yet confidential information has become an increasingly 
important business asset.  In Kansas, trade secret law has the power to 
protect certain important business information; recent examples include a 
formula for coating elbow pipes,4 blood management software,5 
customer lists,6 and a recipe for making pizza sausage.7 
                                                          
 1. 266 P.3d 516, 519–21 (Kan. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 520, 533 (“[T]ort causes of action cannot include a claim to recover for trade secrets; 
KUTSA is the exclusive remedy.”). 
 3. ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 959 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 4. See Progressive Prods., Inc. v. Swartz, 258 P.3d 969, 977–78 (Kan. 2011). 
 5. See Mediware Info. Sys., Inc. v. McKesson Info. Solutions, LLC, No. 06-2391-JWL, 2007 
WL 926142, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2007). 
 6. See Fireworks Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1066 
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It has become increasingly unclear how widely trade secret 
protection extends and what claims are available to trade secret owners 
in the unfortunate event of trade secret misappropriation.  Often, litigants 
seeking to protect their trade secrets and recover for misappropriation 
pursue a scattershot approach to litigation.8  Thus, litigants might file a 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim under their state’s version of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in conjunction with a number of 
other potential causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty, 
tortious interference, misappropriation of confidential information not 
rising to the level of trade secret, conversion, and various other state law 
claims.9  This was the case in Wolfe Electric, where it was unclear to the 
trial court how to treat these common law causes of action in 
combination with claims under the KUTSA.10  This lack of clarity 
resulted in an appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, which reversed and 
remanded the case to the trial court because of its misinterpretation of the 
KUTSA.11 
Whether a court will allow other claims based on the 
misappropriation of a trade secret depends on whether the state’s adopted 
version of the UTSA preempts those claims.  Great uncertainty exists as 
to whether courts will permit such claims as there are almost as many 
different interpretations of this preemption provision as there are 
common law versions of the UTSA.  Despite the purported “uniformity” 
of a uniform law governing trade secret protection, little uniformity 
exists in practice. 
In Kansas in particular, the federal and state district courts have 
received little guidance from the higher courts.  Neither the Tenth Circuit 
nor the state’s appellate courts have issued a decision that directs how to 
apply the displacement provision in misappropriation cases.12  As a 
result, trial judges have relied on different approaches used in other 
jurisdictions that are often as unresolved on this issue as Kansas courts.13  
                                                                                                                       
(D. Kan. 2001). 
 7. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 8. See Victoria A. Cundiff, Recent Developments in Trade Secret Law, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK 785, 811 (2010). 
 9. Id. at 811–12. 
 10. See Wolfe Elec., Inc. v. Duckworth, 266 P.3d 516, 533 (Kan. 2011) (“[T]ort causes of 
action cannot include a claim to recover for trade secrets; KUTSA is the exclusive remedy.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
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Kansas, however, is in a unique position.  Because so little case law has 
developed on the issue, the appellate courts have an opportunity to 
definitively decide how to apply the KUTSA displacement provision 
without overruling precedent or grappling with unfavorable legislation 
on the issue. 
This Note will explore the different methods of applying the UTSA 
and determine the appropriate method for applying the KUTSA.  Part II 
will begin by examining the background of the UTSA.  It will outline the 
shift from common law trade secret protection to a uniform regime under 
the statute, and it will discuss the mechanics of the UTSA, such as its 
components and its necessity in conjunction with other intellectual 
property regimes.  Part II will also review the various methods that 
courts have used for determining whether other common law claims are 
displaced.  Next, Part III will examine how courts have applied the 
KUTSA.  This section will then propose an interpretation that allows for 
a uniform application in Kansas and that could serve as a model for 
uniformity if adopted by other jurisdictions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Shift from the Common Law to a Uniform Law 
Trade secret law is part of the law of unfair competition.14  Trade 
secret law initially developed through state common law and was 
eventually included by the American Law Institute in the Restatement 
(First) of Torts.15  Judicial decisions drew guidance from the Restatement 
of Torts, and “each state constructed, on a case-by-case basis, its own 
body of trade secret law.”16  Building case law in this way, however, led 
to great inconsistencies and uneven development in the treatment of trade 
secret protection from state to state,17 and the need for a uniform act to 
                                                          
 14. Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error 
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 495 (2010). 
 15. See id. at 500–01. 
 16. Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States’ 
Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49, 49–50 (1990). 
 17. In the prefatory note to the UTSA, the committee responsible for drafting the Act stated: 
Notwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade secret law to interstate 
business, this law has not developed satisfactorily.  In the first place, its development is 
uneven.  Although there typically are a substantial number of reported decisions in states 
that are commercial centers, this is not the case in less populous and more agricultural 
jurisdictions.  Secondly, even in states in which there has been significant litigation, there 
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codify the principles of common law trade secret protection became a 
concern for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL).18  The Patent Section of the American Bar Association 
also recognized a need for “a uniform state law to protect against the 
wrongful disclosure or wrongful appropriation of trade secrets, know-
how[,] or other information maintained in confidence by another.”19  
Thus, the NCCUSL drafted the UTSA, acknowledging the power of 
trade secret law in guiding ethical business practices20 and the need to 
consolidate and harmonize the common law principles while filling gaps 
left by the courts.21 
The NCCUSL approved and recommended the UTSA for enactment 
in 1979.22  The UTSA was later amended in 1985 to improve its 
linguistic clarity.23  The UTSA’s adoption by the NCCUSL, however, 
was not enough to give it the force of law; the legislature of each state 
had to enact the UTSA.24  As a result, the evolution from the 
Restatement’s view of trade secrets to the UTSA’s reinterpretation was a 
slow process.25  On September 2, 1988, Alaska became the twenty-sixth 
state to adopt the UTSA, which resulted in the UTSA displacing the 
Restatement as the predominant body of law governing trade secrets.26 
At present, forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands have adopted some version of the UTSA.27  So far 
in 2012, Massachusetts has introduced the act.28  New York, North 
Carolina, and Texas have not adopted any version of the UTSA.29  
Kansas enacted the Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (KUTSA) in  
                                                                                                                       
is undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret protection, and the 
appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005). 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Samuels & Johnson, supra note 16, at 50. 
 21. See Why States Should Adopt UTSA, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative. 
aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UTSA (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 22. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 16, at 50. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Sandeen, supra note 14, at 538. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/ 
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Acts: Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx? 
title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
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1981,30 and in 1988, the Kansas Legislature amended it to reflect the 
UTSA’s 1985 amendments.31 
B. The Mechanics of the UTSA 
1.  The UTSA Compared to Other Intellectual Property Regimes 
The UTSA works in conjunction with patent and other intellectual 
property law to protect developers and users of commercially valuable 
ideas and technology.32  Two major differences exist between trade 
secret law and patent law.  First, and perhaps most significantly, trade 
secret law does not utilize a registration system—like that employed in 
patent law—where the owner of a trade secret may publicly identify its 
property rights before a conflict arises.33  The result is that patents are 
open to public inspection while trade secrets must remain protected as 
secrets to retain their value.34  Second, a patent affords its owner a time-
limited monopoly over the patented technology, and any use of that 
technology during that limited time constitutes an infringement.35  Trade 
secret law, on the other hand, only protects an owner against the 
wrongful acquisition and subsequent improper appropriation of the 
protected information.36  A trade secret loses protection through the 
owner’s voluntary use and disclosure or through a third party’s discovery 
of the secret “through legitimate, good faith means, such as reverse 
engineering.”37  So, although it is lawful to “steal” a trade secret by 
discovering it through reverse engineering, a patent is good against the 
whole world, including those who acquire the information through good 
faith means.38  Thus, an owner’s property right in a trade secret is defined  
                                                          
 30. See Progressive Prods., Inc. v. Swartz, 258 P.3d 969, 974 (Kan. 2011). 
 31. See 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 1333, ch. 221 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3333 
(2005)); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2(b), 3(a), 7, 11 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 619, 633–34, 
651 (2005). 
 32. Progressive Prods., 258 P.3d at 976. 
 33. Cundiff, supra note 8, at 787. 
 34. Progressive Prods., 258 P.3d at 976. 
 35. Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 976 A.2d 84, 92 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See ConFold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 959 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155–56 (1989); Rockwell Graphic 
Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991); Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 
F.2d 314, 334 n.24 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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by the extent to which the owner can effectively maintain its secrecy by 
preventing its disclosure to others.39 
2. The UTSA’s Components 
The UTSA provides the owner of a trade secret with a civil action for 
compensatory damages,40 punitive damages,41 attorney’s fees,42 and 
injunctive relief43 if the owner of such information can show (1) that the 
information is a trade secret as defined by the UTSA44 and (2) actual or 
threatened misappropriation of the information.45  To prevail on a 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim in Kansas, the plaintiff must 
show “that the defendants employed theft or breached a duty to maintain 
secrecy in order to acquire trade secrets that had an independent 
                                                          
 39. Progressive Prods., 258 P.3d at 976. 
 40. Section 3(a) of the UTSA provides that a plaintiff “is entitled to recover damages for 
misappropriation.” It provides that “[d]amages can include both the actual loss caused by 
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into 
account in computing actual loss.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 
633–34 (2005). 
 41. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b) (“If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the 
court may award exemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any award made under 
subsection (a).”). 
 42. A court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in the event that “(i) a claim of 
misappropriation is made in bad faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in 
bad faith, or (iii) willful and malicious misappropriation exists.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 4. 
 43. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2. 
 44. The UTSA defines a “trade secret” as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
 45. The UTSA defines “[m]isappropriation” as: 
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know 
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade 
secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper 
means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of the disclosure or use, 
knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from 
or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under 
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived 
from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its 
secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or 
had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired 
by accident or mistake.” 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2). 
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economic value and that these secrets were not readily ascertainable by 
proper means by the defendants.”46  The plaintiff must also demonstrate 
that it made reasonable efforts to maintain the information in secrecy.47  
The KUTSA, however, does not require the owner to employ a particular 
means of protecting a secret; it only requires that the owner protect the 
secret with “efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.”48 
3. Section 7: The “Effect on Other Law” Provision 
Section 7 of the UTSA expressly provides that it displaces 
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other state law providing civil 
remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.49  Section 7 expressly 
does not displace contract claims, criminal remedies, or claims under 
federal law.50  The Kansas equivalent of section 7 is the “Application of 
act” provision, which has adopted the exact language of the UTSA.51 
The NCCUSL’s 1985 amendments produced substantial changes to 
the language of section 7; nevertheless, the content remained 
substantially similar to the 1979 original.52  The concern regarding 
section 7’s original language was that it “did not make it clear that the 
UTSA would not preclude breach of contract claims and associated 
contract remedies.”53  Thus, the 1985 amendments clarified that section 7 
was not intended to displace contractual liability and contractual 
remedies for misappropriation.54  Of the forty-six states that have 
adopted the UTSA, three states—Iowa, Nebraska, and New Mexico—
                                                          
 46. Progressive Prods., Inc. v. Swartz, 258 P.3d 969, 976 (Kan. 2011). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 978 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3320(4)(ii) (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 49. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7. 
 50. Id.  See Cundiff, supra note 8, at 812. 
 51. The KUTSA provides that: “this act displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary and other law 
of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3376(a).  Subsection (b) then provides that “this act does not affect: (1) Contractual remedies, 
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; (2) other civil remedies that are not 
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon 
misappropriation of a trade secret.” Id. § 60-3326(b).  Compare id. § 60-3376, with UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 7. 
 52. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 16, at 88–89. 
 53. See Sandeen, supra note 14, at 536. 
 54. Samuels & Johnson, supra note 16, at 89. 
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chose not to adopt section 7.55  Further, five states—Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, and Washington—have not adopted the 
1985 amendments.56  Several states—including California and Illinois—
have modified the language of section 7.57  Kansas adopted the section 7 
language verbatim.58 
Section 7 was necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the act: 
to create uniformity in the varying causes of action and legal theories of 
trade secret protection.59  The UTSA could not accomplish its uniformity 
goal, however, unless it first wiped the slate clean by displacing the 
preceding common law that had accumulated.60  Although the UTSA and 
its displacement provision have been applied widely in the states that 
have adopted it, there has been a great lack of consistency in its 
application.  Moreover, a lack of consensus exists regarding the proper 
application and the intended scope of the provision. 
C. Methods for Determining Displacement of State Law 
There are almost as many schools of thought attempting to reconcile 
the different state and federal courts’ interpretations of the UTSA’s 
displacement provision as there are court decisions.61  Analysts of these 
                                                          
 55. John T. Cross, UTSA Displacement of Other State Law Claims, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 445, 
448 (2010). 
 56. Id. at 449. 
 57. Id. (noting that the Illinois UTSA explicitly includes unfair competition in section 7(a) and 
that the California UTSA only discusses its effect on other California statutes). 
 58. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3326 (2005), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005). 
 59. See Cross, supra note 55, at 446 (“UTSA § 7 is the linchpin of this harmonization.”); see 
also Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 693 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d in 
part, 717 N.W.2d 781, 788–94 (Wis. 2006) (stating that “the purpose of the preemption provision is 
to preserve a single tort action under state law for misappropriation of a [statutory] trade secret . . . 
and thus to eliminate other tort causes of action founded on allegations of misappropriation of 
information” (citing Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. Del. 
1991))). 
 60. See Sandeen, supra note 14, at 533–34 (“[T]he UTSA would not accomplish its central 
mission if the (often inexact and incomplete) legal theories and causes of action that preceded it were 
allowed to co-exist. Thus, what ultimately became § 7 of the UTSA (Effect on Other Law) was 
proposed.”). 
 61. Generally speaking, there is a lack of uniformity even in the way legal analysts and judges 
who have attempted to apply the displacement provision have categorized and applied the various 
approaches to interpreting the displacement provision.  Although the three interpretations 
enumerated in this section might not be the exclusive means of interpreting the provision, the 
difficulty in grouping the different schools of analysis into distinct categories further lends support to 
the proposition that a more uniform approach is necessary. 
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trends have attempted to group courts’ decisions into different methods 
of assessing whether the UTSA preempts a particular claim; however,  
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there has been little success in attempting to reconcile these different 
lines of cases.62 
1. The Scope of the UTSA 
There is fundamental discord among courts regarding the UTSA’s 
scope.  Courts disagree on whether the UTSA should control all 
confidential information or only information qualifying as a trade secret 
under the definition provided in the UTSA.63  Courts generally follow 
                                                          
 62. Professor Cross observes that courts disagree on the UTSA’s subject matter and “on 
whether the UTSA is meant to govern all secrets, or only those secrets that qualify as a UTSA trade 
secret.”  Cross, supra note 55, at 451.  He further notes that “even when courts find that the 
information in question falls within the subject matter of the UTSA, they differ on what test to use to 
determine whether a state law claim is displaced.”  Id. 
Cundiff’s assessment differs somewhat, noting that “there are at least two distinct trends 
followed by courts assessing whether particular claims are preempted.”  Cundiff, supra note 8, at 
812.  She posits that “[t]he majority view is that whether a claim is pre-empted by the [UTSA] 
should generally be determined at the pleading stage, or at least early on.”  Id.  If it is apparent at the 
pleading stage “that a plaintiff has merely restated its trade secrets claims as separate tort claims . . . , 
but the claims in fact all arise out of the same nucleus of common facts as the trade secrets 
misappropriation claim, then the claims are pre-empted and should be promptly dismissed.”  Id.  
Cundiff states that the minority view is that even information not qualifying as a trade secret may 
still be protected as “confidential information” under common law causes of action.  Id. 
Courts have offered varying interpretations.  One line of cases holds that UTSA preempts only 
those civil claims based upon trade secrets as defined in the statute, but does not preempt civil claims 
based on information that fails to meet that statutory definition.”  See, e.g., Mediware Info. Sys., Inc. 
v. McKesson Info. Solutions, LLC, No. 06-2391-JWL, 2007 WL 926142, at * 2 (D. Kan. 2007) 
(citing Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 793 (Wis. 2006)).  The court 
further explained that “[a]nother line of cases holds that determining whether the allegedly 
misappropriated information constitutes a trade secret is irrelevant for preemption purposes because 
the UTSA preempts all claims based upon the unauthorized use of information, even if the 
information does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret.”  Id. (citing Cenveo Corp. v. 
Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 527720, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2007); Genzyme Corp. v. 
Bishop, 463 F. Supp.2d 946, 949 (W.D. Wis. 2006)).  Another court explained that other UTSA 
jurisdictions have not been uniform in their interpretation of the displacement provision.  Powell 
Prods., Inc. v. Marks, 948 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo. 1996).  As it observed, “[s]everal courts 
have stated that where a plaintiff alleges in his complaint that information was misappropriated and 
that such information constituted trade secrets, all claims that are factually related to that 
misappropriation are preempted.”  Id. (citing Hutchinson v. KFC Corp., 809 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D. 
Nev. 1992)).  The court continued by observing that “[o]ther courts reason that a plaintiff should be 
permitted to proceed upon all causes of action ‘to the extent that the causes of action have ‘more’ to 
their factual allegations than the mere use or misappropriation of trade secrets.”  Id. (quoting Micro 
Display Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 204–05 (D. Minn. 1988)).  The court concluded 
by noting that “some courts have held that common law tort claims are preempted only ‘to the extent 
directed at trade secret misappropriation,’ implying that certain common law claims do not depend 
upon the information misused being in the nature of a trade secret.”  Id. (quoting Web Commc’ns 
Grp., Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). 
Professor Cross’s analysis is the analytical framework used in this Note. 
 63. See Cross, supra note 55, at 451.  The Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski cases 
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two theories when defining the scope of the UTSA’s application.64  The 
analysis under each theory helps courts determine whether the 
information in question falls within the scope of the UTSA and, thus, 
whether the court even needs to consider the displacement provision.65 
The first theory assumes that because the UTSA defines the term 
“trade secret,” section 7 does not apply in cases where the information 
does not rise to the level of a statutorily defined trade secret.66  This is 
essentially a literal reading of the displacement provision.  If the 
information does not meet the statutory definition of a UTSA trade 
secret, then the plaintiff is free to sue on any of the other potentially 
overlapping common law claims.67 
The other theory regarding the breadth of the UTSA allows courts to 
analyze UTSA displacement when a party brings a common law claim to 
protect any kind of secret business information, regardless of whether it 
rises to the level of a UTSA trade secret.68  This approach treats the 
                                                                                                                       
demonstrate how even two courts in the same state can make fundamentally different decisions 
about the scope of the UTSA displacement provision.  Compare Burbank Grease, 717 N.W.2d at 
785 (determining that the displacement provision of the Wisconsin UTSA only applied if the 
information in question qualified as a UTSA trade secret, thereby leaving undisturbed other civil 
remedies based on the misappropriation of confidential information), with Burbank Grease Servs., 
LLC v. Sokolowski, 693 N.W.2d 89, 101–02 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d in part, 717 N.W.2d 781 
(Wis. 2006) (holding that the Wisconsin UTSA displaces common law claims based on 
misappropriation of trade secrets or other confidential information even if that confidential 
information does not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret). 
 64. See Cross, supra note 55, at 451–52 (noting that courts disagree on what is the “subject 
matter” of the UTSA and defining what Professor Cross terms the “Trade Secrets Only” view and 
the “All Confidential Information” view). 
 65. E.g., Burbank Grease, 717 N.W.2d at 793–94 (finding that it was unnecessary to apply the 
displacement provision at all because the information in question did not qualify as a UTSA trade 
secret and that the plaintiffs were free to bring other tort claims relating to the same confidential 
information underlying the potential UTSA claim). 
 66. See, e.g., Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 527720, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
12, 2007) (holding that the Pennsylvania Trade Secrets Act does not displace common law tort 
claims prior to a determination that the information that is the subject of the suit is a trade secret); 
Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop, 463 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (holding that until it is 
determined whether the allegedly misappropriated information rises to the level of a trade secret, the 
preemption question cannot be addressed). 
 67. Cross, supra note 55, at 451–52 (“[B]ecause the information in th[e] case was not a trade 
secret, the plaintiff was free to sue for breach of loyalty and intentional interference with a business 
relationship, even though these claims dealt with the same underlying facts as a UTSA claim . . . .” 
(citing Burbank Grease, 717 N.W.2d at 793–94)); see, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 
714, 726–27 (D.S.C. 2007) (finding that if the information at issue does not constitute a statutorily 
defined trade secret, then it is not protected by the South Carolina UTSA and other common law 
causes of action are available as remedies to the plaintiff). 
 68. See Cross, supra note 55, at 452; see, e.g., Mortg. Specialists Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 
664 (N.H. 2006) (holding that the New Hampshire UTSA “preempts claims that are based upon 
unauthorized use of information, regardless of whether that information meets the statutory 
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UTSA as the sole noncontract and noncriminal protection for any kind of 
confidential information.69  As a result, if the information does not meet 
the statutory definition of a trade secret, then it might not receive any 
protection at all.70 
2. “Tests” for Displacement 
Just as courts disagree on the scope of application for the UTSA, 
courts have diverging opinions on what “test” to apply to determine 
whether the statute displaces a plaintiff’s other common law claims.71  
Broadly speaking, courts’ treatment of the “Effect on Other Law” 
provision fall into three categories: field displacement, comparison of 
elements, and common nucleus of facts.72 
Some courts interpret the displacement provision to mean that the 
UTSA displaces all common law causes of action that fall within the 
subject matter of the UTSA.73  This is arguably the broadest test because 
these courts view the UTSA as the sole protection available for all 
information potentially falling within the “field” of the UTSA.74  There 
                                                                                                                       
definition of a trade secret”). 
 69. Section 7 of the UTSA specifically provides exceptions to its displacing effect only for 
contractual remedies and criminal remedies. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 
U.L.A. 651 (2005); see also BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 235 P.3d 310, 323 
(Haw. 2010) (holding that the Hawaii UTSA “preempts non-contract, civil claims based on the 
improper acquisition, disclosure[,] or use of confidential and/or commercially valuable information 
that does not rise to the level of a statutorily defined trade secret”). 
 70. Cross, supra note 55, at 453. This interpretation of the scope of the UTSA assumes that the 
drafters intended for the UTSA to be the sole protection for any kind of confidential information, 
and that the UTSA intended to deny such protection to information not rising to the UTSA-defined 
level of “trade secret.”  Id. 
 71. Id. at 451. 
 72. Id. at 454.  In an effort to lend some consistency to the analysis of courts’ treatment of the 
displacement provision, Professor Cross outlined three broad “tests” that courts often apply to 
determine whether a state law claim is displaced.  Id.  Professor Cross’s formulation is by no means 
the only way to divide up court decisions applying the preemption provision.  See supra notes 61–
62. 
 73. See, e.g., Omnitech Int’l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 11 F.3d 1316, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
the UTSA cannot be the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty claim and that a plaintiff’s breach of 
fiduciary duty claim is displaced to the extent it is grounded in those allegations).  This excludes the 
contract and criminal remedies for which the UTSA displacement provision makes an exception.  
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7. 
 74. Professor Cross refers to this as the “field displacement test” because it “mirrors the ‘field 
preemption’ approach used in connection with certain federal laws.”  Cross, supra note 55, at 455.  
That is to say, “[w]hen a court determines that Congress meant for its legislation to occupy a 
particular field, all state laws touching on that field are automatically preempted.”  Id.  The field 
displacement view of the “Effect on Other Law” provision “likewise assumes that the UTSA was 
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are, of course, different interpretations of this test depending on how 
broadly the court reads the UTSA.75  On the one hand, some courts 
interpret the UTSA as applying to all types of confidential business 
information regardless of whether the information rises to the level of a 
trade secret.76  Some courts, on the other hand, take the narrower 
approach that the UTSA only applies to information rising to the 
statutorily defined level of a trade secret.77 
A second approach compares the elements of the common law claim 
that the plaintiff would like to bring to protect the confidential 
information with the elements of a UTSA claim for misappropriation of a 
trade secret.78  When the elements significantly overlap, the UTSA 
displaces the common law claim.  When significant differences exist 
between the claims, however, the common law claim may stand.79  There 
                                                                                                                       
meant to occupy the field.”  Id.  This is a loose analogy in that the original UTSA is not actually seen 
as displacing state laws; rather, the analogy assumes that all other state laws regarding confidential 
information must be displaced by the UTSA as adopted by that state. 
 75. For a discussion of the UTSA’s scope, see supra Part II.C.1. 
 76. See, e.g., Ranger Enters., Inc. v. Leen & Assocs., Inc., Nos. 97-35077, 97-35078, 1998 WL 
668380, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 21, 1998) (holding that because “Oregon law does not distinguish 
between ‘trade secrets’ and ‘confidential information,’” the Oregon UTSA preempts 
“misappropriation of confidential information claims just as it preempts claims concerning trade 
secrets” (citing Kamin v. Kuhnau, 374 P.2d 912, 920 (Or. 1962))); see also Cross, supra note 55, at 
455 (“Under the majority All Confidential Information view, a court applying the field displacement 
test treats the UTSA as the only law that imposes a duty on a defendant not to obtain or use someone 
else’s secret. . . . Because the UTSA occupies the field of commercially valuable secrets, other state 
laws can never be used to protect that information.”); supra Part II.C.1. 
 77. See, e.g., Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
“[t]he dominant view is that claims are foreclosed only when they rest on the conduct that is said to 
misappropriate trade secrets,” so that asserting that a customer list is a trade secret “does not wipe 
out claims of theft, fraud, and breach of the duty of loyalty that would be sound even if the customer 
list were a public record”); Craig Neon, Inc. v. McKenzie, 25 Fed. App’x 750, 752 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that plaintiff’s claim was not preempted because the “plaintiff’s fraud-and-deceit claim 
could stand alone even without proving that the [information was] a trade secret” and the Oklahoma 
UTSA does not apply to civil remedies not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret); 
Appalachian Railcar Servs., Inc. v. Boatright Enters., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 829, 852 (W.D. Mich. 
2008) (finding that where information qualifies as a trade secret under the Michigan UTSA, the 
common law claims are preempted); BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., 320 F. 
Supp. 2d 804, 808 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (finding the plaintiff’s state law claims were displaced by the 
Wisconsin UTSA to the extent that they are based upon the defendant’s alleged improper use of the 
plaintiff’s trade secrets); Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F. Supp. 
2d 652, 659 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that “unless it can be clearly discerned that the information in 
question constitutes a trade secret, the Court cannot dismiss alternative theories of relief as 
preempted by the [Virginia UTSA]”). 
 78. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 714, 725 (D. S.C. 2007) (determining that 
the elements of the cause of action under the South Carolina UTSA should be compared to the 
elements of the common law claim to determine whether a particular cause of action is displaced). 
 79. An important consideration for the courts applying this interpretation is what constitutes a 
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are two variants of this particular approach.  Some courts ask whether the 
common law claim requires a greater number of meaningful elements 
than does a UTSA claim.80  If the common law claim has the same 
number or fewer elements than a UTSA claim, then the UTSA claim will 
displace it.81  Conversely, if the state law claim requires an element that 
is not necessary to bring a UTSA claim, then it will generally survive 
displacement.82  Under the second variant of this test, courts examine the 
elements of the common law claim to determine whether they differ 
qualitatively from a UTSA claim.83 
                                                                                                                       
significant difference in the claims. 
 80. Cross, supra note 55, at 456; see, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Motorcycle Info. Network 
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1181 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (stating that the court would dismiss the common 
law claims “if they contain no material distinction from the [Florida UTSA] claim” and further 
noting that “if the allegations of trade secret misappropriation alone comprise the underlying wrong, 
only the [Florida UTSA] claim will survive the motion to dismiss”); Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop 
Slazenger Grp. Ams., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 216, 220–21 (D. Del. 2004) (reasoning that if plaintiff 
cannot show that its negligence claim is supported by facts other than those underlying the 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim, then the negligence claim will be preempted); Powell Prods., 
Inc. v. Marks, 948 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo. 1996) (stating that a plaintiff can bring common 
law claims that include additional elements not required by a misappropriation claim under the 
Colorado UTSA); Micro Display Sys., Inc. v. Axtel, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. Minn. 1988) 
(stating that a plaintiff may maintain separate common law “causes of action to the extent that the 
causes of action have ‘more’ to their factual allegations than the mere misuse or misappropriation of 
trade secrets”); Weins v. Sporleder, 605 N.W.2d 488, 492 (S.D. 2000) (finding that “[u]nder the 
facts of this case, the tort claims and the trade secret claims are inseparable”). 
 81. See Callaway Golf, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21; Powell Prods., 948 F. Supp. at 1474 
(finding that the plaintiff’s claims for interference with its business relationships did not depend on 
the determination that the plaintiff’s manufacturing process and machine are protectable as trade 
secrets and, thus, reasoning that the defendants “could be liable for interference with business 
relations even if they did not misappropriate any trade secrets from plaintiff”). 
 82. See Am. Honda Motor Co., 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 (finding that “material distinctions 
between [plaintiff’s deceptive and unfair trade practices, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation] 
claims and the [Florida UTSA] claim” saved them from preemption ); Powell Prods., 948 F. Supp. at 
1474 (finding that the plaintiff’s conspiracy to misappropriate trade secrets claim was not displaced 
because a conspiracy requires an agreement, which is not an element of a UTSA misappropriation 
claim); Coulter Corp. v. Leinert, 869 F. Supp. 732, 735 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s 
claim of breach of common law duties of confidentiality and loyalty “include[d] allegations beyond 
disclosure of trade secrets” and therefore were not barred). 
 83. Cross, supra note 55, at 457; see, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 
1344, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (preempting plaintiff’s conspiracy claim because it was predicated on 
the misappropriation of trade secrets and was not an “independent and alternative conspiracy 
theory”); Jano Justice Sys., Inc. v. Burton, No. 08-3029, 2008 WL 5191765, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 
2008) (allowing plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty to survive preemption because conduct 
beyond the alleged misappropriation would support the claim); Cardinal Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 
582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 985 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim was 
preempted because the “overarching allegation [was] that the defendants conspired to steal 
confidential and proprietary information, some or all of which may constitute a trade secret”); Auto 
Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 144 F. Supp. 2d 784, 789 (W.D. Ky. 2001) 
(determining that the Kentucky UTSA does not necessarily displace a cause of action having to do 
 
DILLON FINAL.docx 8/2/2012  11:37 AM 
1162 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
A third approach analyzes the facts underlying the state law claim.  If 
the core of facts giving rise to the state law claim is the same as those 
necessary to bring a UTSA misappropriation claim, then the USTA 
displaces the state law claim.84  These courts have determined that the 
USTA displaces civil claims deriving from a claim of misappropriation 
of a trade secret.85  Essentially, the court must “look beyond the label of 
the claims” to the facts supporting the particular state law claim to 
determine whether the plaintiff has merely restated its misappropriation 
of a trade secret claim as separate tort claims.86  If the common law claim 
arises from the same facts as the misappropriation of trade secrets claim, 
then the common law claim is deemed derivative of the misappropriation 
                                                                                                                       
with trade secrets if “the plaintiff [only] demonstrates a further factual basis for fraud or deceit that 
has as an element the use of trade secrets”); Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 665 
(N.H. 2006) (finding that a claim is not preempted “where the elements of the claim require some 
allegation or factual showing in addition to that which forms the basis for a claim of 
misappropriation”). 
 84. Cross, supra note 55, at 458–59.  This is the approach most often applied in cases coming 
from California courts.  See, e.g., Ali v. Fasteners for Retail, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070 (E.D. 
Cal. 2008) (stating that the provision of the California act displaces common law claims that are 
based on the “identical nucleus” of facts as a trade secrets claim (quoting Silicon Image, Inc. v. 
Analogix Semiconductor, Inc., No. C-07-0635 JCS, 2007 WL 1455903 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2007)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1033 
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding common law unfair competition and unjust enrichment counts based on 
the same nucleus of facts as a trade secrets claim are displaced under the California UTSA).  It is 
important to note that the language of the displacement provision of the California UTSA differs 
from that of the original UTSA.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  This approach has 
spread to other courts.  See Chatterbox, LLC v. Pulsar Ecoproducts, LLC, No. CV 06-512-S-LMB, 
2007 WL 1388183, at *4 (D. Idaho May 9, 2007) (finding that the plaintiff’s claims for unjust 
enrichment and unfair competition were “based on the same nucleus of facts as its trade secrets 
claim and, therefore,” were preempted); BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 235 P.3d 
310, 324 (Haw. 2010) (holding that tort, restitutionary, and other laws of Hawaii are displaced by the 
Hawaii UTSA if the proof establishing the common law claim would also “simultaneously establish” 
a misappropriation of trade secrets claim (quoting Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec. Indus., Inc., 375 F. 
Supp. 2d 649, 658 (M.D. Tenn. 2004))). 
 85. On-Line Tech., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (finding that fraud and unfair trade practices claims were preempted because the plaintiff’s 
allegations related to the misappropriation of trade secrets and “constituted nothing more than 
[Connecticut UTSA] violations”); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1297–
98 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that because the plaintiff’s claims of conversion, breach of confidential 
relationship and duty of good faith, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit were based upon trade 
secret, they were superseded by the Georgia UTSA); Secure Energy, Inc. v. Coal Synthetics, LLC, 
No. 4:08CV1719 JCH, 2010 WL 1691454, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27, 2010) (finding that the Missouri 
UTSA displaces a plaintiff’s common law claims that are “[b]ased upon the same facts” as the 
plaintiff’s UTSA claim). 
 86. Secure Energy, 2010 WL 1691454, at *1 (citing Weins v. Sporleder, 605 N.W.2d 488, 491 
(S.D. 2000)); Weins, 605 N.W.2d at 492 (“A plaintiff ‘may not rely on acts that constitute trade 
secret misappropriation to support other causes of action.’” (quoting Ed Nowogtoski Ins., Inc. v. 
Rucker, 944 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. Ct. App. (1997)). 
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claim and is thus displaced.87 
Presently, these approaches to the UTSA displacement of common 
law claims cannot be squarely reconciled.  This leaves those with 
potentially protectable information unsure of how litigation would 
proceed. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Displacement in Kansas Cases 
The difficulty in determining exactly how and when courts should 
apply the UTSA is particularly apparent in Kansas, as the Kansas 
Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the KUTSA displacement 
provision.  Although there has been some trade secret litigation in 
Kansas, very few of these cases have touched upon the issue of 
displacement, and there has been almost no discussion of displacement in 
the state’s appellate courts.  This absence of dispositive decision-making 
in the state’s upper courts has led to a lack of uniformity among lower 
courts’ decisions.88  The lower Kansas courts have had to look to other 
jurisdictions for guidance, yet the lack of uniformity elsewhere has only 
fostered further inconsistency in Kansas courts’ decisions.  In addition, 
Kansas’s federal district courts have made a handful of decisions 
regarding displacement.  These courts have applied variations of the 
above tests but have offered little explanation as to why the KUTSA has 
displaced a certain claim. 
For the first time, the Kansas Supreme Court discussed with some 
detail the KUTSA “Application of act” section in Wolfe Electric.89  
                                                          
 87. Secure Energy, 2010 WL 1691454, at *1 (citing Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Hartford Life Ins. 
Co., No. 4:00-CV-70CEJ, 2002 WL 32727076, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2002)).  In Secure Energy, 
the court deemed the plaintiff’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, violation of Missouri Uniform Securities Act, tortious interference with contract, 
unfair competition, and civil conspiracy were preempted by the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(MUTSA), because they were all merely restatements of the plaintiff’s MUTSA claims.  Id. at 2–6.  
Similarly, courts have found that the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA) “eliminated common law 
claims based on conduct which might support an ITSA action” and held that “if the operative facts 
are arguably cognizable under the ITSA, [then] any common law claim that might have been 
available on those facts in the past now no longer exists in Illinois.”  Learning Curve Toys, L.P. v. 
Playwood Toys, Inc., No. 94 C 6884, 1999 WL 529572, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1999). 
 88. C&F Packing Co. v. IPB, Inc., No. 93 C 1601, 1994 WL 30540 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 1994), 
rev’d by 224 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that “Kansas courts do not appear to have addressed 
this precise issue” of the interpretation of the KUTSA preemption provision). 
 89. Wolfe Elec., Inc. v. Duckworth, 266 P.3d 516, 531–33 (Kan. 2011). 
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Although the court declined to explicitly interpret the displacement 
provision because neither party raised the issue at the trial level,90 the 
court did provide some guidance for the trial court on remand that could 
indicate how the Kansas Supreme Court would interpret this provision.  
The court provided that plaintiff Wolfe Electric’s trade secrets claims 
based upon tort—including breach of fiduciary duty and tortious 
interference—were preempted by KUTSA based upon the language of 
section 60-3326.91  The court’s analysis supports the proposition that a 
common law claim that is merely duplicative of a misappropriation of 
trade secret claim is displaced by the statutory enactment.92  This is a 
relatively undisputed proposition, however, because the KUTSA codifies 
the common law misappropriation of a trade secret claim.93 
The court, in providing the trial court with guidance on remand, 
emphasized the distinction between information rising to the statutory 
definition of a trade secret and information that is merely confidential but 
not a trade secret.94  The court concluded that the trial court was “overly 
inclusive in its [jury] instructions on the claims for recovery for trade 
secrets and for mere confidential information.”95  This, combined with 
the court’s assertion that the KUTSA is the “exclusive remedy” for 
recovery on trade secrets,96 may support the interpretation that only 
information rising to the level of a KUTSA trade secret is protectable.  
The court, however, did not go so far as to explicitly state this 
proposition.  The court merely emphasized the distinction between trade 
secrets and confidential information to make it clear to the trial court that  
                                                          
 90. Id. at 532–33. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 533.  As the court observed: 
[T]he drafters [of Section 7 of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, identical to K.S.A. 60–
3326] explicitly abrogate other civil remedies based on misappropriation of a defined 
trade secret and, among the courts, there seems to be little dispute that the UTSA did, in 
fact, intend to abrogate other civil remedies when a claim involves misappropriation of 
trade secrets. 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Julie Piper, Comment, I Have a Secret?: Applying the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act to Confidential Information That Does Not Rise to the Level of Trade Secret 
Status, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 367 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. See BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 235 P.3d 310. 314 (Haw. 2010) 
(“Courts that have considered the UTSA’s preemption provision have ‘uniformly interpreted [it] to 
preempt previously existing misappropriation of trade secret actions, whether statutory or common 
law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 
654 (E.D. Tenn. 2004))). 
 94. Wolfe Elec., 293 Kan. at 533. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3326 (2005)). 
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its jury instructions must more clearly distinguish between claims that 
support recovery under KUTSA and claims that do not.97 
In concluding its analysis, the court made clear that it limited its 
analysis only to tort claims solely based upon misappropriation of trade 
secrets by stating that “[a]s for Wolfe Electric’s assertion that KUTSA 
does not displace other tort causes of action for recovery of damages for 
nontrade secrets, we do not address it for several reasons.”98  Thus, while 
the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the displacement problem for the 
first time in Wolfe Electric and provided some guidance for lower courts, 
the opinion makes it clear that the court is not willing to address the 
displacement provision until the issue is directly raised on appeal, after a 
full discussion in the lower courts.99 
The Kansas federal district court examined the preemption provision 
for the first time in 1991 in Herbster v. Global Intermediary, Inc., where 
the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims of fraud and breach 
of the duties of fair dealing and good faith based on the KUTSA 
preclusion.100  Instead of applying any of the tests commonly used by 
other courts,101 the court merely applied the standard for a motion to 
dismiss.102  The court thus limited its inquiry to whether the defendant 
could show that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle 
him to recovery.103  Although the court quoted section 60-3326, the court 
did not apply that language when making its determination that the 
plaintiff could bring his breach of implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing and fraud claims.104  The court did not expressly state that the 
claims survived potential KUTSA displacement; instead, the court found 
that the available facts could support the common law claims.105 
                                                          
 97. Id.  The Kansas Supreme Court also stated that the “KUTSA only prohibits 
misappropriation of ‘trade secrets.’ It does not mention ‘confidential information.’ Accordingly, 
remedies concerning nontrade secrets, e.g., mere confidential information, cannot be obtained 
through a KUTSA cause of action.”  Id. at 523. 
 98. Id. at 533. 
 99. See id. (“[T]he parties should be given the opportunity to fully brief and argue the issue, 
instead of this court attempting to decide it without the benefit of their briefs and arguments and the 
trial court’s analysis.”). 
 100. No. 89-2198-V, 1991 WL 205659, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1991). 
 101. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 102. The standard applied for the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was whether “it 
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of 
recovery that would entitle him to relief.”  Herbster, 1991 WL 205659, at *1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  Although it is not exactly clear from the facts of the case, it does not appear that the 
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The Kansas courts did not again publish an opinion discussing the 
displacement provision until May 2001, when the topic arose in both 
Airport Systems International, Inc. v. Airsys ATM, Inc.106 and Fireworks 
Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, Inc.107  The district court did 
not explicitly address the displacement question in Airport Systems 
because the defendant failed to argue that the plaintiff’s KUTSA claim 
might have precluded its unfair competition claim.108  Instead, the court 
merely stated that “[w]hile the KUTSA is possibly relevant to the issue 
of preemption, . . . [m]ere passage of the KUTSA does not show that the 
legislature intended to displace all common law remedies for 
misappropriation of trade secrets or other confidential business 
information.”109  This statement, in particular, highlights the lower 
courts’ confusion as to how they should apply the KUTSA displacement 
provision.  First, the KUTSA is not merely “possibly relevant to the issue 
of preemption” of a common law unfair competition claim—it is directly 
relevant because the Kansas legislature specifically included a 
displacement provision in section 60-3326.110  Second, the “mere passage 
of the KUTSA” does in fact demonstrate a legislative intent “to displace 
all common law remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets” because 
the plain language of section 60-3326(a) clearly states that “this act 
displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary[,] and other law of this state 
providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.”111  If the 
“mere passage” of the KUTSA does not show a legislative intent to 
effect the application of the KUTSA’s plain language, then there would 
have been little purpose in passing the legislation in the first place. 
In Fireworks Spectacular, after concluding that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover for misappropriation of trade secrets under the 
KUTSA,112 the federal district court “determin[ed] that, to the extent [the 
breach of fiduciary duty] claim is based upon [the defendant’s] 
misappropriation of trade secrets, it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim 
                                                                                                                       
plaintiff’s fraud claim was at all based upon the misappropriation claim in the first place.  The court 
noted that plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed fraud “in inducing him to move to Kansas 
and perform work without any intention of actually hiring him for his efforts.”  Id.  Thus, none of the 
hallmarks of trade secret misappropriation appear to be present in the fraud claim. 
 106. 144 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 107. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 108. 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1271 n.4. 
 109. Id. at 1271. 
 110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3326(a) (2005). 
 111. Id. 
 112. 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
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brought pursuant” to the KUTSA.113  Thus, the court found that the 
KUTSA only partially displaced the plaintiff’s claim. 
Similarly, in Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v. ACI 
International, Inc., the district court considered the defendant’s claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty against a third-party defendant.114  The 
defendant claimed that the third-party defendant had breached its 
fiduciary duty by accumulating trade secrets for later improper use.115  
The court determined that because “the KUTSA ‘displaces conflicting 
tort, restitutionary[,] and other law of this state providing civil remedies 
for misappropriation of a trade secret’”116 and “[b]ecause this theory of 
recovery for breach of fiduciary duty is duplicative of [defendant’s] 
claim brought under the KUTSA, it is displaced by the KUTSA.”117  
Therefore, the court determined it would not consider the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim in addition to a misappropriation of trade secrets 
claim.118 
In both Fireworks Spectacular and Guang Dong, the court declined 
to articulate a clear rule or test and instead merely deemed the breach of 
fiduciary duty claims to be “duplicative” of the misappropriation of trade 
secrets claims.119  As a result, no clear rule emerges from either of these 
cases as to when a particular common law claim—such as breach of 
fiduciary duty—is displaced by the KUTSA.  Moreover, there is some 
reason to believe that these district court decisions might conflict with 
the KUTSA.  The comments to the UTSA expressly note that “[t]he Act 
does not apply to a duty imposed by law that is not dependent upon the 
                                                          
 113. Id. at 1068.  The plaintiffs argued that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty by 
“engaging in unfair competition, disclosing and using trade secrets and proprietary information of 
[the plaintiff] for his own personal benefit and gain.”  Id. 
 114. No. 03-4165-JAR, 2008 WL 53665, at *18 (D. Kan. Jan. 2, 2008). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3326(a) (2005)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. (devoting only one paragraph to the issue of KUTSA displacement and concluding 
without elaboration that “[b]ecause this theory of recovery for breach of fiduciary duty is duplicative 
of [the party’s] claim brought under KUTSA, it is displaced by the KUTSA”); Fireworks 
Spectacular, Inc. v. Premier Pyrotechnics, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1068 (D. Kan. 2001) 
(determining that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was displaced by the KUTSA to the extent it 
was based on the plaintiff’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim brought pursuant to the 
KUTSA).  Like in Guang Dong, the court gave the displacement issue only fleeting treatment in a 
single paragraph and failed to elaborate upon its decision to displace a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim.  Id.  In making its decision about the displacement provision’s application, the federal district 
court in Guang Dong relied solely upon the Fireworks Spectacular decision and the language of 
section 60-3326.  See Guang Dong, 2008 WL 53665, at *18. 
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existence of competitively significant secret information, like an agent’s 
duty of loyalty to his or her principal.”120 
The district court explicitly declined to make a determination of how 
Kansas should apply section 60-3326 in Mediware Information Systems, 
Inc. v. McKesson Information Solutions, LLC.121  The court addressed the 
split in courts’ applications of the different lines of cases and determined 
that there was no need to “predict which view Kansas would adopt, 
however, because it [found that] the tortious interference claims alleged 
by [the plaintiff] in this case [were] not ‘based upon misappropriation of 
a trade secret’ and thus [were] not preempted by [section] 60-3326.”122  
In its determination that the tortious interference claims were not 
preempted, the court applied what was essentially a combination of two 
of the above-described tests—the comparison of elements test and the 
common nucleus of facts test.123  The court looked at the facts of each 
claim along with essential elements of each claim and determined that 
there were “facts in support of these tortious interference claims [that] 
would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief, regardless of the success of its 
misappropriation claim.”124 
Taken together, these Kansas cases show an erratic application of 
section 60-3326.125  There has been little uniformity in the manner of the 
KUTSA’s application and in which claims are generally displaced.  So 
far, there has not been a uniform means of applying the KUTSA 
displacement provision, and Kansas courts have found little help from 
courts in other jurisdictions given the variety of interpretations available 
from which to choose. 
                                                          
 120. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7, cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005). 
 121. No. 06-2391-JWL, 2007 WL 926142, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2007). 
 122. Id. at *2–3. 
 123. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 124. Mediaware, 2007 WL 926142, at *3. 
 125. Section 60-3326 has been interpreted in a few instances in other states’ courts. For example, 
the District Court for the Western District of Virginia applied the KUTSA preemption provision to 
the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim on a motion to dismiss.  Beacon Wireless Solutions Inc. v. 
Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 5:11-cv-00025, 2011 WL 4737404, at *13 (W.D. Va. 2011).  The court found 
that the claim was not displaced because “the unjust enrichment claim encompasses more conduct 
than the mere use and disclosure of confidential information.”  Id.  The Federal Circuit also briefly 
interpreted the KUTSA in C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The 
court affirmed the district court’s finding that the KUTSA displaced the plaintiff’s fraud claim 
because it was “indistinguishable from” the trade secret misappropriation claim.  Id.  The Federal 
Circuit did not so much interpret the KUTSA as note that it found no error in the lower court’s 
decision.  Id. 
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B. A Proposed Solution 
Kansas has a unique opportunity to set a precedent as to how states 
that have adopted the UTSA should apply the displacement provision.  
Because Kansas courts have developed so little case law on the topic of 
KUTSA displacement of common law claims and because the case law 
that has developed is so disjointed, there seems to be no better time than 
the present to wipe the slate clean and develop a uniform standard.  A 
Kansas Supreme Court decision interpreting this provision would not 
face any conflicting precedent or poor legislative decisions.  Thus, the 
court has the opportunity to be the first and final arbiter of the legislative 
intent as expressed in the statute. 
A solution to the ambiguity present in the interpretation of section 
60-3326, and necessarily section 7 of the UTSA, must consider both the 
scope of the KUTSA and the appropriate test for determining those 
claims that it displaces.  In order to best fulfill the objectives of the 
UTSA, Kansas and other UTSA jurisdictions should interpret the UTSA 
as applying to all claims where a party invokes a common law claim to 
protect any confidential business information, regardless of whether that 
information rises to the level of a UTSA trade secret.  In order to be 
effective and to fulfill the UTSA’s purpose, this interpretation must be 
adopted by all UTSA jurisdictions and uniformly applied. 
Uniformity seems to have been the underlying goal of the drafters in 
their attempt to eliminate the various interpretations and applications of 
trade secret common law through the creation of the UTSA, and Kansas 
clearly desired a similar result in enacting a uniform law governing trade 
secrets.  The Kansas legislature specifically adopted this goal in section 
60-3327’s “Uniformity of act” provision, which provides that “[t]his act 
shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among states 
enacting it.”126  This section, which mirrors section 8 of the UTSA, 
makes it clear that the underlying goal of the uniform act is to promote 
uniformity among all the jurisdictions adopting the act.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court further emphasized this point, stating that the KUTSA 
“tells us that it seeks uniformity with other jurisdictions that have 
adopted the [UTSA].”127 
                                                          
 126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3327 (2005). 
 127. Progressive Prods., Inc. v. Swartz, 258 P.3d 969, 976 (Kan. 2011). 
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Aside from making the goal of uniformity clear, however, this 
section provides little guidance to the courts about how they should 
actually apply the KUTSA.  Because the displacement provision is part 
of a broader statute, a court cannot read it in isolation.  Interpretation of 
this provision requires a court to look to other provisions of the KUTSA 
for guidance.128  Moreover, in addition to simply satisfying the goals of 
both the KUTSA and the UTSA, a need for interstate uniformity exists 
because business transactions often cross state borders. 
Despite the clear legislative mandate, Kansas courts have paid little 
attention to the KUTSA’s uniformity goal.  Some district courts have 
looked to other jurisdictions to compare different methods of applying 
the displacement provision, but weighing different jurisdictional 
doctrines has led to a different doctrinal outcome each time.129  Kansas 
courts must interpret the KUTSA as applying to all claims where a party 
invokes common law to protect any confidential business information, 
regardless of whether that information rises to the level of a KUTSA 
trade secret.130  If courts permit common law claims for the unauthorized 
use of confidential information that does not meet the statutory definition 
of a trade secret, then they would undermine the uniformity underlying 
the KUTSA and the UTSA.  As the UTSA was originally written, the 
displacement provision stated that the UTSA would be “the exclusive 
state tort remedy for trade secret misappropriation.”131  While questions 
arose in the drafting as to the exact language of section 7, “there was no 
dispute about the desirability of such a section.”132  Moreover, 
“[p]ermitting litigants in UTSA states to assert common[]law claims for 
the misappropriation or misuse of confidential data would reduce the 
UTSA to just another basis for recovery and leave prior law effectively 
                                                          
 128. See Moser v. State Dept. of Revenue, 213 P.3d 1061, 1064 (Kan. 2009) (“Courts should not 
focus on an isolated part of a legislative act but are required, if possible, to consider and construe 
together all parts of the act in pari materia.” (citing McIntosh v. Sedgwick Cnty., 147 P.3d 869, 875 
(Kan. 2001))). 
 129. See supra Part III.A. 
 130. This is the interpretation advocated by Justice Bradley in her dissenting opinion in Burbank 
Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski.  717 N.W.2d 781, 799–803 (Wis. 2006) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting).  The majority held that the Wisconsin UTSA should not apply to misappropriation of 
confidential information falling outside the statutory definition of a trade secret.  Id. at 798 (majority 
opinion).  The majority reasoned that the statute left available all other civil actions that did not 
depend on information meeting the statutory definition of trade secret.  Id. 
 131. Sandeen, supra note 14, at 534 (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION ACT § 6 (First 
Tentative Draft 1977)). 
 132. Id. 
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untouched.”133  Any other interpretation of KUTSA’s preemption 
penumbra would fail to uphold the goal of promoting uniformity in trade 
secret protection.  Thus, courts should broadly interpret the KUTSA as 
displacing common law claims that are based solely on allegations of 
unauthorized use of confidential business information regardless of 
whether that information meets the statutory definition of a trade secret.  
Such an interpretation would further the KUTSA and UTSA uniformity 
goal. 
In Learning Curve Toys, L.P. v. Playwood Toys, Inc.,134 a case from 
the Northern District of Illinois, the district court emphasized a similar 
line of reasoning.  The court noted that the Illinois version of the UTSA 
intended to “codify all the various common law remedies for theft of 
ideas”135 and that “plaintiffs who believe their ideas were pilfered may 
resort only to the” Illinois version of the UTSA.136  In its analysis, the 
court considered whether the plaintiff could maintain idea 
misappropriation and unjust enrichment claims, and it determined that 
Illinois had “abolished common law theories of misuse of such [secret] 
information. . . . Unless defendants misappropriate[d] a statutory trade 
secret, they [did] no legal wrong.”137  Interestingly, a similar approach 
has been recognized before in the Kansas case of BioCore, Inc. v. 
Khosrowshahi.138  The court observed that Kansas courts do not 
distinguish between trade secrets and confidential information, stating 
that “[e]ven if confidential information can be something less than a 
trade secret, it must at least be a trade secret to give its owner a property 
right in it.”139  Although the court might have overstated the past 
application of such a standard in Kansas, this standard should prevail 
when courts apply the KUTSA and other UTSA variants. 
Moreover, courts should not distinguish between KUTSA-defined 
trade secrets as actionable under KUTSA and all other confidential 
information as actionable under Kansas common law.  Instead, courts 
should look at information as actionable or non-actionable—that is, only 
                                                          
 133. Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” 
Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 888 (1998). 
 134. No. 94 C 6884, 1999 WL 529572 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1999). 
 135. Id. (citing Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 136. Id. (citing Powell Prods., Inc. v. Marks, 948 F.Supp. 1469, 1474 (D. Colo. 1996)). 
 137. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der 
Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 138. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D. Kan. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 80 Fed. App’x 619 (10th Cir. 
2003). 
 139. Id. at 1238 (citing Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 679 P.2d 206, 211 (Kan. 1984)). 
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information protected by the KUTSA would be actionable.140  Thus, 
information should be divided into actionable trade secrets and 
unprotected information.141  The KUTSA would thus eliminate the 
artificial distinction between information that is a trade secret and other 
confidential information; instead, all secret information with economic 
value would fall within the definition of a trade secret.142  Such a 
distinction would emphasize that only information rising to the level of a 
trade secret receives protection.  Common law claims concerning 
confidential business information that is not a trade secret under KUTSA 
would no longer be available because all claims stemming from the same 
acts as the alleged misappropriation are intended to be displaced.143  
Moreover, such an interpretation places a higher value on the KUTSA’s 
statutory definition of trade secret in section 60-3320. 
This interpretation of the KUTSA accords with the commentary 
provided by the Uniform Law Commissioners on the adoption of the 
UTSA.144  The commentary articulates that a state’s dependence on 
common law remedies for the resolution of disputes involving the 
misappropriation of trade secrets “creates great uncertainty for industry, 
particularly for companies that conduct business in more than one 
state.”145  The Commission further underscored the desirability of 
uniformity, stating that “[e]very state will benefit from the simplicity of 
                                                          
 140. See Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 664 (N.H. 2006) (stating that the New 
Hampshire UTSA provides that “information is classified only as either a protected ‘trade secret’ or 
unprotected ‘general . . . knowledge.’” (quoting Unikel, supra note 133, at 867–68) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); accord Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., 
Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 702, 722 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“[A]llowing otherwise displaced tort claims to 
proceed on the basis that the information may not rise to the level of a trade secret would defeat the 
purpose of the UTSA.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bliss Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Midwest 
Brake Bond Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948–49 (W.D. Mich. 2003))); Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel 
Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 54 n.22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (Information that does not fit [the 
definition of trade secret], and is not otherwise made property by some provision of positive law, 
belongs to no one, and cannot be converted or stolen.”). 
 141. Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of 
Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 662 (1996). 
 142. Id. 
 143. In Learning Curve Toys, L.P. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., the court held that a claim may be 
displaced even if the information at issue does not constitute a trade secret.  No. 94 C 6884, 1999 
WL 529572, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 1999); see also Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Bentley Pharm., Inc., 
388 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 (D. Del. 2005) (“Because all claims stemming from the same acts as the 
alleged misappropriation are intended to be displaced, a claim can be displaced even if the 
information at issue is not a trade secret.”). 
 144. See Why States Should Adopt UTSA, supra note 21 (underscoring the importance of 
uniformity and simplicity as policy goals underlying the creation of the UTSA). 
 145. Id. 
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the Uniform Trade Secrets Act” because “[u]nder the common law, some 
fundamental concepts are disturbingly unclear.”146  Moreover, in its 
advocacy for the adoption of UTSA, the Commission specifically 
stressed that UTSA provides uniformity.  It stated that “[v]ariations in 
state law have created confusion about which law should be applied, 
[which has] encourage[d] litigants to ‘forum shop,’” and that “[a]doption 
of the UTSA by all states would eliminate these problems.”147  Forum 
shopping is problematic because it can lead to problems with unequal 
protection.  Litigants cannot be assured that two courts in Kansas will 
treat the same trade secret and common law claims similarly because 
there is so little guidance.148  A lack of instruction as to how to apply the 
statute has fostered arbitrary decision-making.  If Kansas truly has 
adopted the KUTSA for the purpose promulgated by the Commission—
that is to say, if it wants uniformity in the treatment of trade secrets—it 
must employ a uniform application of the displacement provision to 
other state law claims.149 
Comparison of this particular application of the UTSA to a similar 
provision of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) sheds 
light on an appropriate interpretation of the displacement provision.  
Section 2(c) of the UDTPA states that it “does not affect unfair trade 
practices otherwise actionable at common law or under other statutes of 
this state.”150  The drafters of the UTSA were presumably aware of the 
displacement language used in the UDTPA151 and could have drafted the 
UTSA “Effect on Other Law” provision similarly to allow further 
development of common law theories of liability for confidential 
information not rising to trade secret status.  The drafters, instead, used 
language showing a clear intent to inhibit any further growth of state law 
theories for the protection of confidential information.152 
                                                          
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. For a discussion of how the preemption provision has been applied inconsistently by Kansas 
courts, see supra Part III.A. 
 149. Cf. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the purpose 
of the Illinois UTSA was to codify all the various common law remedies for theft of ideas); 
Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted) (stating that the Illinois UTSA “abolished all common law theories of misuse of 
such [confidential] information” and “unless defendants misappropriate[] a (statutory) trade secret, 
they d[o] no legal wrong”). 
 150. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(c) (repealed 2000), 7A U.L.A. 139 (2005). 
 151. The NCCUSL adopted the UDTPA in 1966, which predates its creation of the UTSA.  Id. 
 152. Sandeen, supra note 14, at 534–35. 
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Similarly, this proposed interpretation of the KUTSA parallels, in 
some ways, the application of federal patent preemption analysis.153  
Federal patent protection broadly preempts other federal and state laws 
because allowing other law to protect patents would undermine “the 
public policy goals manifested in the patent system taken as a whole.”154  
The UTSA similarly has a broad policy goal in favor of uniformity in the 
protection of confidential business information.155  While a comparison 
to the preemptive effects of federal patent law is in no way dispositive of 
questions related to the application of the KUTSA and the UTSA—as 
patent preemption is a matter of federal law preempting state law—some 
of the underlying principles of federal patent law may instruct the UTSA 
displacement analysis.  In this regard, it might be helpful to think about 
UTSA displacement in a manner similar to federal preemption.  For 
example, “[w]hen [a] federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law 
cause of action, a claim [that] comes within the scope of that cause of 
action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal 
law.”156  The analog for the KUTSA would be that when a plaintiff 
pleads common law causes of action pertaining to the misappropriation 
of trade secrets, the court should read the claims as arising from the 
KUTSA and analyze them based on KUTSA’s requirements. 
One should note, however, that this proposed interpretation does 
somewhat conflict with the comment to section 7 of the UTSA. The 
comment states: 
This Act does not deal with criminal remedies for trade secret 
misappropriation and is not a comprehensive statement of civil 
remedies.  It applies to a duty to protect competitively significant secret 
information that is imposed by law.  It does not apply to a duty 
voluntarily assumed through an express or implied-in-fact contract.  
The enforceability of covenants not to disclose trade secrets and 
covenants not to compete that are intended to protect trade secrets, for 
example, is governed by other law.  The Act also does not apply to a 
duty imposed by law that is not dependent upon the existence of  
 
                                                          
 153. See Cross, supra note 55, at 473–74. 
 154. Id. at 473.  Professor Cross does concede, however, that although such an interpretation of 
the UTSA would be in line with federal patent protection, trade secret protection and patent 
protection are in themselves very different concepts under the law.  Id. at 474. 
 155. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3327 (2005) (“This act shall be applied and construed to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among 
states enacting it.”). 
 156. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
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competitively significant secret information, like an agent’s duty of 
loyalty to his or her principal.157 
The difficulty with the proposed interpretation, in particular, is that it 
conflicts with the UTSA comment’s proposition that the UTSA “is not a 
comprehensive statement of civil remedies.”158  The comment seems to 
prefer an element-by-element analysis for claims.159  Such an application 
of the preemption provision, however, would necessitate a case-by-case 
analysis of a litigant’s claims, which would undermine the Act’s 
uniformity goal.  Nevertheless, the application encouraged by the 
comment might not be the most beneficial for Kansas and other states 
adopting a version of the UTSA because it belies the purpose of the 
UTSA to create a uniform act with a uniform application. 
Interjurisdictional uniformity would have the positive effect of 
supplying highly persuasive precedent for Kansas and other states that do 
not produce large amounts of case law.  If all UTSA jurisdictions 
uniformly applied the preemption provision of the UTSA, then Kansas 
attorneys, litigants, and judges could rely on the decisions of other 
jurisdictions for highly persuasive precedent applying to factually similar 
scenarios. 
An approach to the displacement provision that ensures uniformity 
between jurisdictions applying the UTSA would help business owners 
with protectable information plan accordingly to ensure that their 
information will ultimately receive protection.  A more uniform approach 
would also benefit those who transact business in multiple jurisdictions, 
                                                          
 157. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 cmt (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005). 
 158. Id.  This portion of the comment, however, could also be referring to the fact that contract 
claims are specifically saved from displacement in section 7.  See id. § 7. 
 159. Cross, supra note 55, at 477.  Professor Cross suggests that the UTSA displacement 
provision intended for a court’s analysis to “hone in on one particular element of the state law; 
namely, the nature of the defendant’s duty.  If the duty exists regardless of whether the information 
is secret, the Comment indicates the state law is not displaced, even if the information in question is 
a trade secret.”  Id. (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 cmt.).  Professor Cross further explains 
that the comment makes clear the difference between section 7(a) and section 7(b)(2), which at first 
glance seem to say almost the same thing.  Id. at 477–78.  Section 7(a) speaks to “state laws that 
‘provide civil remedies’ for misappropriation of a trade secret,” while section 7(b)(2) pertains to 
state laws “‘based on’ misappropriation of a trade secret.”  Id. at 477 (quoting UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT § 7(a), (b)(2)).  He explains that the comment is meant to illuminate the difference that “a state 
law that is not ‘based on’ misappropriation of a trade secret is not displaced by the UTSA” whereas 
“[section] 7(b)(2) makes it clear that displacement applies only when confidentiality is a defining 
element of the state law claim.  If the state law duty remains available even if the information is not 
secret, the cause of action is not ‘based upon’ misappropriation of a trade secret, and is not 
displaced.”  Id. at 477–78. 
DILLON FINAL.docx 8/2/2012  11:37 AM 
1176 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
as less confusion would attend the application of different states’ 
adoptions of the UTSA.  One commentator has noted that, although 
seemingly counterintuitive, applying the displacement provision to 
“abrogate all other tort remedies for the misuse of confidential 
information deemed not to be a trade secret does effectuate the best 
interests of departing employees.”160  If the UTSA does not displace all 
other state law actions for misappropriation of confidential business 
information not rising to the level of trade secret status, then “employers 
are able to hold former employees liable for using information not 
deemed to be a trade secret under a variety of legal theories.”161  
Although a narrow interpretation of the displacement provision that 
allows employers to hold former employees liable for using information 
not qualifying as a trade secret might sound appealing to employers, such 
a tactic would allow employers to use the common law to create an 
implied non-compete contract with departing employees.162  Allowing a 
variety of claims leaves departing employees unsure of what types of 
claims they might face and, thus, inhibits employee mobility.163  
Moreover, because such an interpretation could limit the damages an 
employer could receive, “employers might be more likely to implement 
employee confidentiality agreements to avoid litigation.”164  This, in turn, 
would encourage better contracting between employers and employees.  
Increased clarity in what kind of information can be protected under 
which claims will give business owners the best tools for protecting their 
trade secrets. 
Moreover, such a uniform approach would help attorneys advise 
clients with greater certainty if they know exactly what type of 
information the UTSA will protect and which claims will make it past 
the pleading stage.  Otherwise, trade secret litigants might bring as many 
claims as possible because they are unsure which will survive that 
jurisdiction’s particular test for displacement.165  This proposed 
                                                          
 160. Piper, supra note 92, at 382. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (citing Tait Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: A Proposal for 
Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes Under the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶10). 
 163. See Graves, supra note 162, at ¶2 (warning that if employers can sue over information that 
is not secret or that does not meet the statutory requirements of being a trade secret, then the result is 
that employee mobility is inhibited). 
 164. Piper, supra note 92, at 382. 
 165. Cundiff, supra note 8, at 814. 
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interpretation would thus decrease confusion at the pleading stage.166  If a 
court allows a plaintiff to proceed with common law claims until it has 
determined whether the information supporting the claims rises to the 
level of a trade secret, then it draws out litigation and creates another 
opportunity for the court to undermine the UTSA’s uniformity goals.167  
Conversely, under this proposed approach, it would not matter if a 
plaintiff’s common law claims were based upon trade secrets or merely 
confidential information because only trade secret information would be 
protectable.  Because common law causes of action protecting against 
the misappropriation of confidential business information that is not a 
KUTSA trade secret would no longer be available to plaintiffs, this 
proposed interpretation would facilitate judges’ ruling on motions 
regarding plaintiffs’ causes of action at the early stages of litigation.168 
Although this proposed interpretation of section 60-3326 might 
appear harsh, it would not leave unprotected all confidential business 
information that does not meet the statutory definition of trade secrets.  
Litigants could still take advantage of the contracts exceptions provided 
by section 60-3326 regardless of whether the information meets the 
statutory definition of a trade secret, and this interpretation would 
encourage thoughtful contracting between parties privy to confidential 
                                                          
 166. See Michael A. Jacobs, Michael I. Katz & Jana G. Gold, Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
Preemption: An Obscure Doctrine Finally Gets its Day in Court, 12 CYBERSPACE LAW. 15 (2007).  
As one set of commenters explained: 
Under the weak preemption view, courts should not rule on motions to dismiss or for 
summary adjudication based on preemption, other than to dismiss a common law claim 
for misappropriation of trade secrets. Under the strong preemption view, defendants can 
take steps early in the litigation to narrow the scope of the pleadings. By motion or 
demurrer, a defendant can seek dismissal of statutory and tort-based theories of recovery 
for theft of confidential information. 
Id. 
 167. See Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 
702, 721–22 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (stating “[w]hile some courts have indeed allowed plaintiffs to 
proceed with common[]law claims until it can be determined whether the information at issue 
constitutes a trade secret, other courts—representing the majority view—have rejected this approach, 
and gathering cases”). 
 168. See, e.g., id. at 722 (“Thus, the Court joins the majority view in finding that displacement of 
common[]law claims may precede the Court’s determination of whether the information at issue 
constitutes a trade secret.  To find otherwise would contravene the general purpose of Ohio’s UTSA: 
uniformity.”); see also Graves, supra note 162, at ¶3.  Graves warns that issues of UTSA preemption 
are often briefed early on in a case “on crowded motion calendars [and] present[] only surface 
citations to courts [that] have little time to study these complex issues.”  Id.  Graves asserts that “[a]s 
a result, the published rulings indicate that courts and attorneys are missing key arguments and 
considerations, even when they reach the right conclusions.”  Id.  The adoption of uniform 
preemption principles could be the cure to attorneys and judges alike having to sift through myriad 
cases reaching different conclusions. 
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business information.  This interpretation would also make it incumbent 
upon the owner of a trade secret to take reasonable measures to protect 
that information from disclosure to the public.  The careful company will 
take steps to prevent its trade secrets from being disclosed in the first 
place and, should those secrets be exposed to the public, take precautions 
to ensure that it protects the information.  Employers have a number of 
tools at their disposal to protect such information.  An employer could 
require employees to sign nondisclosure agreements and conduct exit 
interviews to impress upon the employees their obligation to prevent 
information disclosure or theft.  Through the use of company policies, 
employee handbooks, or additional training, 
“an employer can make it clear that an employee is only authorized to 
access [certain information] and is only allowed to copy and transmit 
the employer’s electronic data to further the business interests of the 
employer and not to promote or further the business interests of the 
employee or some third party.”169 
As a further measure, employers can effectively deter information theft 
by conducting exit interviews and reminding employees of their 
obligation not to disclose the employer’s secrets.170  This can be 
especially effective when “coupled with giving the departing employee a 
copy of his or her nondisclosure agreement and asking the employee to 
certify in writing that the employee has returned all” copies of company 
data.171 
A trade secret gains its value and protection because the public does 
not know the information.  Thus, the owner must necessarily take 
measures to protect such information.  By implication, only that 
information requiring such a high level of secrecy deserves protection 
under the UTSA.  By employing good business practices, however, the 
holder of confidential information can afford it the same level of 
protection as the information qualifying as a trade secret.  Thus, it is 
clear that a broader interpretation of KUTSA preemption will not leave 
owners of confidential business information without recourse.  This 
interpretation, instead, will encourage thoughtful and proactive business 
planning to prevent the disclosure and misappropriation of that 
                                                          
 169. John Vering & Jeffrey L. Schultz, Employees’ Misappropriation of Electronic Data: 
Federal and Kansas Computer Tampering Acts, J. KAN. B. ASS’N. May 2011, at 16, 24–25. 
 170. Id. at 25. 
 171. Id. 
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information in the first place. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Absent a strongly uniform interpretation of the UTSA preemption 
provision, litigants are at the mercy of the whims of the courts.  Nearly 
every case in Kansas regarding the UTSA displacement provision has 
resulted in a different interpretation, which gives litigants very little 
direction as to how to prepare for litigation and offer businesses little 
insight as to how to best protect their information.  A uniform 
interpretation of the displacement provision would remedy the current 
patchwork of decisions interpreting the displacement of state law claims.  
To accomplish the goals of the UTSA, courts must interpret the 
displacement provision in a way that encourages uniformity across the 
UTSA jurisdictions.  Unless the UTSA is seen as the sole means of 
protecting economically valuable business information, it cannot be 
uniformly applied.  This Note proposes a solution that will achieve the 
goal of uniformity if adopted widely in Kansas and other UTSA 
jurisdictions. 
